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THE POSITIVE LINK BETWEEN FINANCIAL 




There is no agreement regarding the growth-enhancing effects of financial liberalization, 
mainly because it is associated with risky international bank flows, lending booms, and crises. 
In this paper we make the case for liberalization despite the occurrence of crises. We show 
that in developing countries trade liberalization has typically been followed by financial 
liberalization, which has indeed led to financial fragility and a greater incidence of crises. 
However, financial liberalization also has led to higher GDP growth. In fact, the 
fastestgrowing countries are typically those that have experienced boom-bust cycles. That is, 
there is a positive link between GDP growth and the bumpiness of credit, which is captured 
by the negative skewness - not by the variance - of credit growth. To substantiate our 
interpretation of the data we present a model that shows why in countries with severe credit 
market imperfections, liberalization leads to higher growth and, as a byproduct, to financial 
fragility. Thus, occasional crises need not forestall growth and may even be a necessary 
component of a developing country's growth experience. Finally, our analysis indicates that 
foreign direct investment does not obviate the need for risky international bank flows, as the 
latter are the only source of financing for most firms in the nontradables sector. 
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 1. Introduction 
By now there is widespread agreement that trade liberalization enhances growth. No such agreement 
exists, however, on the growth-enhancing effects of financial liberalization, in large part because it is 
associated with risky capital flows, lending booms, and crises. 
That financial liberalization is bad for growth because it leads to crises is the wrong lesson to 
draw. Our empirical analysis shows that, in countries with severe credit market imperfections, financial 
liberalization leads to more rapid growth, but also to a higher incidence of crises. In fact, most of the 
fastest-growing countries of the developing world have experienced boom-bust cycles. We argue that 
liberalization leads to faster growth because it eases financial constraints, but that this occurs only if 
agents take on credit risk, which makes the economy fragile and prone to crisis. An implication of our 
analysis is that the international bank flows that follow financial liberalization and increase financial 
fragility are an important component of a rapid-growth path. Foreign direct investment is not a substitute 
for risky bank flows. 
We also find that asymmetries between the tradables (T) and nontradables (N) sectors are key 
to understanding the links among liberalization and growth, as well as the boom-bust cycles typically 
experienced by liberalized developing countries. 
To substantiate our interpretation of the data, we present a model that establishes a causal link 
from liberalization to growth, and in which the same forces that lead to faster growth also generate 
financial fragility. The model leads us to divide our data set into countries with high and intermediate 
degrees of contract enforceability (which we call high-enforceability and medium-enforceability countries, 
or HECs and MECs, respectively).  
Our data analysis shows that, across MECs, trade liberalization has typically been followed by 
financial liberalization, which has led to financial fragility and to occasional crises. On average, however, 
both trade and financial liberalization have led to more rapid long-run growth in GDP per capita across the 
set of countries with active financial markets. Furthermore, we find that this positive link is not generated 
by a few fast-growing countries that experienced no crisis. Instead, it is typically the fastest-growing 
countries that have experienced crises. This suggests that the same mechanism that links liberalization 
with growth in MECs also generates, as a by-product, financial fragility and occasional crises.  
These facts do not contradict the negative link between growth and the variance of several 
macroeconomic variables—the typical measure of volatility in the literature.  A high variance reflects not 
only the uneven progress, or “bumpiness,” associated with occasional crises, but also high-frequency 
shocks. Instead we measure the incidence of occasional crises by the (negative) skewness of real credit 
growth. Our findings show that fast-growing MECs tend to have negatively skewed credit growth paths. Our explanation for the links among liberalization, bumpiness, and growth is based on the fact 
that many developing countries have severe contract enforceability problems. Because liberalization has 
not been accompanied by judicial reform, these problems have persisted. The key point is that these 
problems affect firms asymmetrically: whereas many T-sector firms can overcome these problems by 
accessing international capital markets, most N-sector firms cannot. Thus N-sector firms are financially 
constrained and depend on domestic bank credit. 
Trade liberalization increases GDP growth by promoting T-sector productivity. Financial 
liberalization adds even more to GDP growth by accelerating financial deepening and thus increasing the 
investment of financially constrained firms, most of which are in the N-sector. However, the easing of 
financial constraints is associated with the undertaking of credit risk, which often takes the form of foreign 
currency–denominated debt backed by N-sector output. Credit risk arises because financial liberalization 
not only lifts restrictions that preclude risk taking, but also is associated with explicit and implicit systemic 
bailout guarantees that cover creditors against systemic crises.
1 Not surprisingly, an important share of 
capital inflows takes the form of risky bank flows, and the economy as a whole experiences aggregate 
fragility and occasional crises. 
Rapid N-sector growth helps the T-sector grow faster by providing abundant and cheap inputs. 
Thus, as long as a crisis does not occur, growth in a risky economy is more rapid than in a safe one. Of 
course, financial fragility implies that a self-fulfilling crisis may occur. And, during a crisis, GDP growth 
falls and typically turns negative. Crises must be rare, however, in order to occur in equilibrium—
otherwise agents would not find it profitable to take on credit risk in the first place. Thus average long-run 
growth may be faster along a risky path than along a safe one. Our model follows this intuition to establish 
a causal link from liberalization to GDP growth. This link is independent of the nominal exchange rate 
regime. 
The argument imposes restrictions on the behavior of credit and of the N-to-T output ratio that 
help us identify the mechanism. First, credit growth and the N-to-T output ratio should fall drastically in 
the wake of crisis, and because crises are infrequent, they should exhibit a negatively skewed distribution. 
Second, during normal times the N-to-T output ratio should vary with credit. Finally, the N-to-T output 
ratio should decrease following trade liberalization and increase following financial liberalization. We 
show that the bumpiness of credit growth and these asymmetric sectoral responses are indeed an empirical 
regularity across MECs. We are not aware of other theoretical arguments that relate the N-to-T output 
ratio to liberalization, growth, and crises and that explains the empirical regularities we have found. 
                                                 
1 We distinguish two types of bailout guarantees: unconditional and systemic. The former are granted whenever an individual 
borrower defaults, whereas the latter are granted only if a critical mass of borrowers default. Throughout this paper we focus on 
systemic guarantees. 
  2Consider next the question of the structure of capital flows. Although several observers have 
advocated limiting bank flows and promoting FDI as a way to reduce financial fragility, our framework 
makes it clear that limiting bank flows may hinder growth. We document that the lion’s share of FDI goes 
to the T-sector or to financial institutions and, moreover, that the small share that goes to the N-sector is 
allocated to very large firms. Thus most of the inflows that end up in the N-sector are intermediated by 
domestic banks. In countries with severe contract enforcement problems, a policy that limits bank flows 
constrains the N-sector at best, and at worst prevents it from growing for years. Thus FDI is not a 
substitute for risky bank flows. 
The findings of this paper do not imply that crises are a good thing. They are the price that 
must be paid to attain rapid growth in the presence of contract enforceability problems. The first-best 
policy is to improve domestic credit markets by implementing judicial reform. If this is not feasible, 
liberalization will likely lead to financial fragility, as risky bank flows become the only source of finance 
for a large group of firms. Such flows are necessary to avoid bottlenecks and ensure long-run growth. 
The link between liberalization and growth has generated controversy, because some 
researchers have found no significant positive link between the two. This finding might be due either to 
the country sample being considered or to the use of openness indicators. The model we present shows 
that the asymmetric sectoral responses and the links among liberalization, bumpiness, and growth arise 
only if contract enforceability problems are severe without being too severe. This underlies the importance 
of the country sample one considers and leads us to focus on the set of countries with functioning financial 
markets. In order to analyze the effects of liberalization, we construct de facto indexes of trade and 
financial liberalization that distinguish the year of liberalization. This allows us to compare the behavior 
of several macroeconomic variables in both closed and open country-years. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next two sections analyze the links among 
liberalization, bumpiness, and growth. Section 4 analyzes the structure of capital flows. Section 5 presents 
some economic policy lessons and concludes. Appendixes to the paper describe the model and the 
construction of our variables. 
  32. The Effects of Liberalization 
In this section we analyze empirically the links among liberalization, financial fragility, and 
growth across the set of countries with functioning financial markets. The mechanism described in the 
introduction operates only in countries with a basic level of contract enforcement that permits agents to 
attain high enough leverage and reap the benefits of liberalization. Thus we restrict our data set to 
countries where the ratio of stock market turnover to GDP was greater than 1 percent in 1998. This set 
consists of sixty-six countries, fifty-two of which have data available for the period 1980-99. Throughout 
the paper we partition this set into seventeen HECs and thirty-five MECs. The former group includes the 
Group of Seven large industrial countries and those countries in which the rule of law index of Kaufman 
and Aart Kraay is greater than 1.4.
2  
To assess the effects of liberalization we analyze several macroeconomic variables before and 
after dates of liberalization. To do this, we construct two de facto indexes that signal the year during 
which an MEC switches from closed to open. The trade liberalization index signals that a country is open 
if its ratio of trade (exports plus imports) to GDP exhibits a trend break or is greater than 30 percent. The 
financial liberalization index signals an opening when the series of cumulative capital inflows experiences 
a trend break or if they exceed 10 percent of GDP. The idea is that a large change in a measure of 
openness indicates that a policy reform has taken place and that the reform has had a significant effect on 
actual flows. 
As explained in more detail in appendix B, we identify the breakpoints using the cumulative 
sum of residuals (CUSUM) method. In most cases the opening dates identified by our indexes are similar 
to those identified by the stock market liberalization index of G. Bekaert, C. Harvey, and R. Lundblad, the 
financial liberalization index of Graciela Kaminski and Sergio Schmukler, and the trade liberalization 
index of Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner.
3
                                                 
2 Kaufman and Kraay (1998). The HECs are Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The 
MECs are Argentina, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. The sample includes forty-one 
of the forty-four countries in the International Finance Corporation’s emerging markets database, the exceptions being Costa 
Rica, Jamaica, and Singapore. Of these, the first two do not satisfy the 1 percent stock market turnover criterion, and for 
Singapore we do not have data. 
3 Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001); Kaminski and Schmukler (2002); Sachs and Warner (1995). Bekaert, Harvey, and 
Lundblad  focus on stock market liberalization, which, although highly correlated with, is distinct from financial or capital 
account liberalization. Listed firms are a privileged set. Stock market liberalization gives them even more opportunities but 
does not by itself relax the credit constraints on all other firms. Our argument is that financial liberalization promotes growth 
because it eases the borrowing constraints faced by the latter set of firms. Kaminski and Schmukler’s (2002) index of financial 
liberalization covers only a small subset of countries. 
  4The country-years identified as liberalized by our indexes do not always coincide with good 
economic times, during which capital is flowing in and the economy is booming. Liberalized country-
years include both boom and bust episodes.  
All the HECs in our sample have been open since 1980, which is the beginning of our sample 
period. Figure 1 exhibits the shares of MECs in our sample that have become open to trade and financial 
flows. It shows that in 1980 only 25 percent of these countries were open to trade. Most of these countries 
started to liberalize in the mid-1980s, and 84 percent had liberalized their trade by 1999.  
 











1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  198519861987198819891990199119921993199419951996  1997  1998  1999
Trade liberalization Financial liberalization  
Note: The figure shows the share of countries that have liberalized relative to the total number of MECs in our sample. 
Source: own calculations. 
 
Several observers have suggested that, to avoid volatility, countries should liberalize trade but 
not financial flows. Our first stylized fact indicates that this has typically not occurred. 
 
Stylized fact 1.  Over the last two decades trade liberalization has typically been followed by financial 
liberalization.  
 
Our indexes show that, by 1999, 72 percent of countries that had liberalized trade had also 
liberalized financial flows, bringing the share of MECs that are financially liberalized from 25 percent in 
1980 to 69 percent. This close association suggests that an open trade regime is usually sustained with an 
open financial regime, because exporters and importers need access to international financial markets. 
Since capital is fungible, it is difficult to insulate the financial flows associated with trade transactions. A 
  5few exceptions such as India, Sri Lanka, and Venezuela have liberalized trade but have not liberalized 
their financial markets. 
The hypothesis that trade liberalization leads to financial liberalization can be tested with 
Granger causality tests. The null hypothesis that trade liberalization does not lead to financial 
liberalization is rejected, with an F statistic of 3.671, which corresponds to a p value of 0.05. By contrast, 
the null hypothesis that financial liberalization does not lead to trade liberalization cannot be rejected, with 
an F statistic of only 0.018, which corresponds to a p value of 0.98. 
 
Liberalization and GDP Growth 
Here we show that, across the set of countries with functioning financial markets, both trade 
and financial liberalization have been, on average, good for growth. This result confirms similar links 
established in the literature. In the next two subsections we address the point, made by several observers, 
that liberalization might not be growth enhancing because it leads to crises. We will show that, indeed, 
financial liberalization has typically been followed by booms and busts, but also that financial fragility has 
been associated with faster GDP growth in spite of the fact that it leads to crises. 
In this section we will not say anything about causality. Appendix A presents a model that 
shows that, in the presence of credit market imperfections, liberalization leads to faster growth because it 
allows financially constrained firms to undertake credit risk, which both eases borrowing constraints and 
generates financial fragility, leading to occasional crises. The model establishes a causal link from 
liberalization to growth and has testable implications, which we will use to identify the mechanism in the 
next section. 
Figure 2 shows that financial liberalization is associated with faster GDP growth. The figure 
depicts GDP growth rates in MECs before and after financial liberalization, after controlling for initial 
income per capita and population growth.
4 This simple graphical representation reveals two patterns: first, 
growth is on average more rapid in open country episodes than in closed;
5 second, in almost every country 
the open episode exhibits more rapid growth than the closed episode.
6
                                                 
4 Only one growth rate is shown for countries that were open or closed  throughout the period. Country episodes of less than 
five years are excluded. 
5 Exceptions are China, which performed better than predicted in spite of being closed, and Greece, which is an 
underperforming open economy. 
6 Here an exception is Indonesia, which grew marginally less rapidly during the open period. However, given Indonesia’s major 
crisis in the postliberalization period, the fact that it recorded a growth rate above the predicted value in the second period is 
still remarkable. Note that even in cases (such as Brazil and the Philippines) where the growth rate is less than predicted, the 
gap between the actual and the predicted value is smaller in the open period. 

















































































































































Note: The country episodes are constructed using windows of different length for each country. Country episodes that 
are shorter than 5 years are excluded. Averaging over these periods, we estimate a simple growth regression by OLS in 
which real per capita growth is the dependent variable and that only include the respective initial income and 
population growth. The figure plots the residuals from this regression.   
Source: Population growth for Portugal: IMF, IFS. All other series: WDI, World Bank.  
 
In order to assess the link between liberalization and growth, we add our liberalization variables to 
a standard growth regression: 
(1)   ∆yit = λyi,ini + γXit + φ1TLit + φ2FLit + εjt      
where ∆yit is the average growth rate of GDP per capita; yi,ini is the initial level of GDP per capita; Xit is a 
vector of control variables that includes initial human capital, the average population growth rate, and life 
expectancy; and TLit and FLit are our trade and financial liberalization indicators, respectively. We do not 
include investment among the control variables, because we expect trade and financial liberalization to 
affect GDP growth through higher investment. 
We estimate the regression in three different ways. First, we estimate a standard cross-sectional 
regression by ordinary least squares. In this case 1980 is the initial year. TLit and FLit take values between 
0 and 1, specifying the share of years that the country was liberalized during our sample period {0, 0.05, 
0.1, …, 1}. Second, we estimate a panel regression using two nonoverlapping windows of time: 1980-89 
and 1990-99. Here the liberalization variables again take a value between 0 and 1 during each subperiod. 
Lastly, we use overlapping time windows as in Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad. For each country and each 
  7variable, we construct ten-year averages starting with the period 1980-89 and rolling forward to the period 
1990-99. Thus each country has up to ten data points in the time-series dimension. In this case the 
liberalization variables take values in the interval [0,1], depending on the proportion of liberalized years in 
a given window. We estimate the panel regressions using generalized least squares. We deal with the 
resulting autocorrelation in the residuals by adjusting the standard errors according to the method of W. 
Newey and K. West.
7
Table 1 reports the estimation results. The financial liberalization variable enters significantly 
at the 5 percent level in all regressions in which it appears. The cross-sectional regression (column 1-1) 
shows that, following financial liberalization, growth in GDP per capita increases by 2.4 percentage points 
a year, after controlling for the standard variables. The corresponding estimates are 1.7 percentage points 
in the nonoverlapping panel regression (column 1-2) and 2.5 percentage points in the overlapping-
windows regression (column 1-3). The last regression is similar to those estimated by Bekaert, Harvey, 
and Lundblad using stock market liberalization dates. They find that GDP growth increases in the range of 
0.4 to 1.5 percentage points. 
 
Table 1. Regressions Explaining Growth in GDP per Capita with Trade and Financial Liberalization
a  
 







Financial liberalization  2.363**  1.691**  2.502**    2.777** 2.278** 
 (0.533)  (0.603)  (0.101)    (0.115) (0.172) 
        
Trade liberalization        1.784**  1.606** 0.147** 
       (0.155)  (0.105) (0.021) 
        
Summary statistics:        
Adjusted R
2 f 0.546  0.633  0.692 0.544 0.747 0.802 
No. of observations  34  59  290 300 280 440 
 
Source: Authors’ regressions. 
a. The estimated equation is equation 1 in the text; the dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of real 
GDP per capita. Control variables include initial per capita income, secondary schooling, population growth, and life 
expectancy. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted for heteroskedasticity according to Newey 
and West (1987). ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level. 
b. Standard cross-sectional regression estimated by ordinary least squares for the period 1980-99. 
c. Nonoverlapping panel regression estimated by generalized least squares (GLS) with two periods, 1980-89 and 1990-
99. 
d. Overlapping panel regression estimated by GLS with data as ten-year averages starting with 1980-89 and rolling 
forward to 1990-99. 
e. Same as column 1-5 but with the addition of high-enforceability countries. 
f. The adjusted R
2 is likely to overestimate the share of the variance explained by our right-hand-side variables because 
of the overlapping nature of the regression. No method comparable to that of Newey and West for the standard errors 
exists for adjusting the R
2, and therefore the values need to be interpreted carefully. 
 
                                                 
7 Newey and West (1987). Our panel is unbalanced because not all series are available for all periods. Our source of data is the 
  8Column 1-4 in table 1 shows that, following trade liberalization, GDP growth increases 1.8 
percentage points a year. This estimate is similar to the 2-percentage-point increase found by Sachs and 
Warner.
8 Notice that the increase in GDP growth is greater following financial liberalization than 
following trade liberalization. Moreover, column 1-5 shows that when we include both variables in the 
growth regression, the marginal effect of trade liberalization falls to 1.6 percentage points, whereas that of 
financial liberalization increases (to 2.8 percentage points). The larger effect of financial liberalization 
suggests that, in addition to the productivity gains from trade liberalization, the easing of financial 
constraints has been an important source of growth. The effect of financial liberalization will be the focus 
of the model we present below. Finally, column 1-6 shows that the positive link between liberalization and 
growth is also evident in the larger sample that includes HECs as well as MECs.  
To deal with the possible endogeneity of the liberalization variables, table B3 in appendix B 
reports estimation results from two-stage least squares regressions using as instruments the legal origin 
index of Rafael La Porta and others,
9 as well as lagged values of all the variables in the regression. The 
table also reports results of regressions with fixed effects and of regressions excluding China and Ireland, 
which may be driven by other factors. Our benchmark results in the first three columns are robust to these 
different estimation methods. The following stylized fact summarizes our findings. 
 
Stylized fact 2.  Over the period 1980-99 both trade liberalization and financial liberalization are 
associated with more rapid growth in GDP per capita across the set of countries with functioning 
financial markets. 
 
The existing literature provides mixed evidence on whether openness promotes long-run 
growth.
10 This can be attributed either to the indicators of openness used or to the sample considered.
 We 
find a statistically significant link for two reasons. First, we identify liberalization dates that allow us to 
compare performance during liberalized country-years with that during nonliberalized ones. Second, we 
restrict our analysis to the set of countries that have functioning financial markets, because only in these 
countries do we expect our mechanism to work. 
In contrast, many papers that do not find a significant link use de jure liberalization indexes or 
de facto indexes that do not identify liberalization dates. However, the de jure indexes currently available 
                                                                                                                                                                
World Development Indicators of the World Bank. See appendix B for the specific sources. 
8 Sachs and Warner (1995). 
9 La Porta and others (1999). 
10 See, for instance, Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001), Chari and Henry (2002), Dollar and Kraay (2002), Edison and 
others (2002), Edwards (1998), Eichengreen (2001), Frankel and Romer (1999), Gourinchas and Jeanne (2003), Prasad and 
others (2003), Quinn (1997), and Rodrik (1998). 
  9for a large set of countries do not accurately reflect countries’ de facto access to international financial 
markets. A country that has liberalized de jure may not implement the new policy for many years or may 
simply lack access to international financial markets despite having liberalized. For example, some 
African countries are de jure more financially liberalized than most Latin American countries yet have 
much smaller international financial flows. Several de facto “openness indexes” measure the size of some 
capital flow categories over the sample period. But because these openness indexes do not identify a 
specific year of liberalization, they are not appropriate for comparing the behavior of macroeconomic 
variables before and after liberalization. 
 
Liberalization and Financial Fragility 
We have shown that both trade and financial liberalization are associated with faster long-run 
growth across countries with functioning financial markets. Financial liberalization has often been 
criticized on the grounds that it leads to crises, which are bad for growth. This argument is neither 
empirically nor conceptually correct: that financial liberalization leads to  infrequent crises does not mean 
that financial liberalization is bad for growth over the long run. We will show that financial liberalization 
does indeed lead to a greater incidence of crisis. Then we will show that the average positive link between 
liberalization and growth documented above is not driven by those rapid-growth countries that have had 
no crises. Instead, countries that grow faster tend to have crises. That is, there is a strong statistical link 
between the incidence of crises and long-run growth. This finding does not imply that crises are good for 
(or cause) growth.  
The model we present in the appendix will show that, in the presence of severe credit market 
imperfections, the forces that generate financial deepening and growth also generate—as a by-product—
financial fragility. Because financial liberalization generates both financial deepening and crises, any 
analysis of the effects of financial liberalization must weigh its benefits against its costs. In short, it would 
be a mistake to reject financial liberalization by focusing only on its costs and its tendency to lead to 
crises. 
To address systematically the issues discussed above, we need a measure of financial fragility. 
Unfortunately, no existing indexes of financial fragility are comparable across countries. In keeping with 
the spirit of this paper, we use instead a de facto measure of fragility: negative skewness of credit growth. 
That is, we capture the existence of fragility by one of its symptoms: infrequent, sharp, and abrupt falls in 
credit growth. These abrupt falls occur during the banking crises that are characteristic of the boom-bust 
cycles that typically follow financial liberalization. During the boom, bank credit expands very rapidly 
and excessive credit risk is undertaken. As a result, the economy becomes financially fragile and prone to 
  10crisis. Although the likelihood that a lending boom will crash in a given year is low, many lending booms 
do eventually end in a crisis.
11 During such a crisis, new credit falls abruptly and recuperates only 
gradually. 
It follows that a country that experiences a boom-bust cycle exhibits rapid credit growth during 
the boom, a sharp and abrupt fall during the crisis, and slow credit growth during the credit crunch that 
develops in the wake of the crisis. Since credit does not jump during the boom, and crises happen only 
occasionally, in financially fragile countries the distribution of credit growth rates is characterized by 
negative outliers. In statistical terms, countries that experience boom-bust cycles exhibit a negatively 
skewed distribution of credit growth. In plain language, the path of credit growth is “bumpy.”
12
 
Figure 3: Credit Growth Distributions 
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b) Descriptive Statistics: 
 
 Thailand  Mexico  India 
Mean 0.143  0.091  0.014 
Std. 0.110  0.303  0.014 
Skewness -1.945  -0.537 0.157 
 
Note: The sample period is 1988- 1999.  
 
If we had infinite data series, the financial liberalization index would be an ideal measure of 
financial fragility. But in a finite sample the index may overlook some cases of fragility that do not— 
yet—reflect bumpiness. Because most MECs that have followed risky credit paths experienced at least 
                                                 
11 On the link between lending booms and crises see Gourinchas, Landerretche, and Valdes (2001), Kaminski and Reinhart 
(1999), Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996a), and Tornell and Westermann (2002). See Bordo and Eichengreen (2002) for a 
historical perspective. 
12 During a lending boom a country experiences positive growth rates that are above normal. However, these are not positive 
outliers because the lending boom takes place for several years, and so most of the distribution is centered around a very high 
mean. Only a positive one-period jump in credit would create a positive outlier in growth rates and generate positive skewness. 
For instance, the increase in capital inflows that takes place when a country liberalizes might generate such positive skewness. 
  11one major crisis during our sample period (1980-99), we find that negative skewness of credit growth is a 
good indicator of the riskiness of the credit path followed by a given country. 
Figure 3 depicts the kernel distributions of credit growth rates for India, Mexico, and Thailand.
13 
Credit growth in India, a typical example of a nonliberalized country, has a low mean, and the data are 
quite tightly distributed around the mean, with skewness close to zero. Meanwhile credit growth in 
Thailand, a prime example of a liberalized economy, has a very asymmetric distribution and is 
characterized by negative skewness. Mexico, like Thailand, has a very asymmetric distribution, and its 
mean is closer to that of Thailand than to that of India. 
Table 2 shows that the link between financial liberalization and bumpiness holds more 
generally across MECs. The table partitions country-years into two groups: years before financial 
liberalization and years after. The table shows that financial liberalization leads to an increase in the mean 
of credit growth of 4 percentage points (from 3.8 percent to 7.8 percent) and a fall in the skewness of 
credit growth from near zero to –1.08, and has only a negligible effect on the variance of credit growth. 
This illustrates the following stylized fact. 
 
Stylized fact 3.  Across MECs financial liberalization has been followed by financial deepening. This 
process, however, has not been smooth but is characterized by booms and occasional busts. 
 









MECs    
Mean   0.078   0.038 
Standard deviation   0.151   0.170 
Skewness -1.086    0.165 
    
HECs    
Mean 0.025  … 
Standard deviation   0.045  … 
Skewness 0.497  … 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
a. The sample is partitioned into two country-year groups: liberalized and nonliberalized. Before the standard deviation 
and skewness are calculated, the means are removed from the series and data errors for Belgium, New Zealand, and 
the United Kingdom are corrected for. 
 
                                                 
13 The simplest nonparametric density estimate of a distribution of a series is the histogram. A histogram, however, is sensitive 
to the choice of origin and is not continuous. We therefore choose the more illustrative kernel density estimator, which 
smoothes the bumps in the histogram (see Silverman, 1986). Smoothing is done by putting less weight on observations that are 
further from the point being evaluated. The kernel function by Epanechnikov is given by (3/4)[1 - (∆B)²]I(|∆B| ≤ 1), where ∆B 
is the growth rate of real credit and I is an indicator function, which takes the value of 1 if |∆B| ≤ 1 and zero otherwise. 
  12Notice that, across HECs, credit growth exhibits near-zero skewness, and both the mean and 
the variance are smaller than across MECs. As we will argue below, this difference reflects the absence of 
severe credit market imperfections in HECs. 
The effect of financial liberalization on the mean and the bumpiness of credit growth is 
represented visually in the event study in figure 4. The top panel shows the deviation of the credit-to-GDP 
ratio, after liberalization, from its mean in normal times (that is, the years not covered by the dummy 
variables in the regression). Over the six years following the liberalization date, the credit-to-GDP ratio 
increases on average by 6 percentage points, and this cumulative increase is significant at the 5 percent 
level. The bottom panel shows the increase in negative skewness, which reflects the increase in 
bumpiness.
14 Here the average negative skewness increases from about zero to -2.5, which is also 
significant at the 5 percent level. 
In the literature, variance is the typical measure of volatility. We choose not to use variance to 
identify growth-enhancing credit risk because a high variance of credit growth reflects not only the 
presence of boom-bust cycles, but also the presence of high-frequency shocks. This may lead to false 
inferences about the links among liberalization, fragility, and growth. In the sample we consider, this 
problem is particularly acute because high-frequency shocks are more abundant than the rare crises that 
punctuate lending booms. 
In short, variance is not a good measure for distinguishing economies that have followed risky, 
growth-enhancing credit paths from those that have experienced high-frequency shocks. By contrast, 
negative skewness of credit growth is a good indicator of the incidence of occasional crises. There might 
be other, more complex indicators of crises. We have chosen skewness because it is a parsimonious way 
to capture the existence of risky credit paths. Furthermore, it complements the variance in the regressions 




                                                 
14 Skewness is computed over a ten-year period. Since the event window is based on only ten data points, we consider a shorter 
window. 
15 Skewness is sufficient to identify a risky path. High kurtosis may come on top of it, but it is neither necessary nor sufficient. 
The combination of the two is sufficient but identifies the extreme cases only. For instance, it does not capture many countries 
that have experienced boom-bust cycles (such as Chile, Mexico, and Turkey). Kurtosis could in principle provide further 
information about the distribution. However, in practice it is not useful in identifying the risky and the safe paths. If there is a 
single, short-lived crisis, an outlier in the distribution leads to a long tail on the left and a high kurtosis. However, if there is 
autocorrelation in the growth rates and the crisis is somewhat persistent, or if there is more than one crisis, the distribution 
becomes bimodal, and kurtosis can easily become very low. It is therefore an excessively sensitive measure of bumpiness. 
Depending on the degree of autocorrelation in the shocks, it could be anything from one to infinity (the kurtosis of a normal 
distribution is equal to 3). In principle, one could argue that other low-frequency shocks affect both safe and risky economies. 
Therefore skewness could pick up countries that did not undertake credit risk but had exogenous negative low-frequency shocks 
that led to a negatively skewed distribution. We are not aware that such shocks have hit MECs during the last two decades. 
Veldkamp (2002) has used skewness to analyze asset price crashes. 
  13Figure 4: Financial Liberalization, Lending Booms and Bumpiness 
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Note:  In panel b) skewness refers to the skewness of real credit growth in the following 10 years. The event windows 
were constructed from panel regressions of the respective variable on dummy variables that take of value of 1 in the 
period where a country liberalized and zero otherwise. The panel regressions are estimated with fixed effects, using a 
GLS estimator. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Financial Fragility and Growth 
We have shown that trade liberalization is typically followed by financial liberalization, which 
in turn leads not only to financial deepening but also to booms and busts. On the one hand, in an economy 
with severe credit market imperfections, financial deepening is good for growth because financing 
constraints are eased. On the other hand, crises are bad for growth because they generate systemic 
insolvencies and fire sales. Ultimately, which of these two effects dominates is an empirical question. The 
following stylized fact summarizes the results that will be discussed below. 
 
Stylized fact 4. Over the last two decades countries with bumpy credit paths have grown faster than those 
with smooth credit paths, when the standard variables are controlled for. 
 
Our results are foreshadowed by figure 5, which shows the link between GDP growth and the 
moments of credit growth across MECs, controlling for initial GDP and population growth. Rapid long-
run GDP growth is associated with a higher mean growth rate of credit, lower variance, and negative 
skewness. 
As the figure shows, countries that have followed a risky path, such as Chile, Korea, and 
Thailand, exhibit negatively skewed credit growth and rapid GDP growth. In contrast, countries that have 
followed a safe path do not exhibit negative skewness and have slow growth; examples are Bangladesh, 
Morocco, and Pakistan. China and Ireland are notable exceptions: they have experienced very rapid GDP 
growth in the last twenty years but have not experienced a major crisis despite a high rate of credit growth. 
  14 
Figure 5: Moments of Credit and GDP Growth 
















































































































































































Note: The graphs plot the moments of real credit growth during the period 1988-1999 against the residuals of a growth regress
controls for initial per capita GDP and population growth. 
  15In order to assess the link between bumpiness and growth, we add the three moments of real 
credit growth to the regression in equation 1: 
(2)  ∆yit = λyi,ini + γXit + β1µ∆B,it + β2σ∆B,it + β3S∆B,it + φ1TLit + φ2FLit + εj,t,    
where ∆yit , yi,ini, Xit, TLit, and FLit are defined as in equation 1, and µ∆B,it, σ∆B,it, and S∆B,it are the mean, 
standard deviation, and skewness of the real credit growth rate, respectively. We do not include 
investment as a control variable because we expect the three moments of credit growth, our variables of 
interest, to affect GDP growth through higher investment. 
We estimate equation 2 using the same type of overlapping panel data regression as for 
equation 1. For each moment of credit growth and each country, we construct ten-year averages starting 
with the period 1980-89 and rolling forward to the period 1990-99. Similarly, the liberalization variables 
take values in the interval [0,1], depending on the proportion of liberalized years in a given window.
16 
Given the dimension of equation 2, the overlapping-windows regression is the most appropriate method 
for the analysis we perform here.
17
Table 3. Regressions Explaining Growth in GDP per Capita with Moments of Credit Growth
a  





Mean of real credit growth rate  0.170**  0.154**  0.093**  0.110** 
  (0.012) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) 
-0.029** -0.030** -0.014** -0.019**  Standard deviation of real 
credit growth rate  (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
0.174** 0.266** -0.095* 0.135**  Negative skewness of real 
credit growth rate  (0.069) (0.021) (0.053) (0.031) 
Financial liberalization     1.894**  1.811** 
     (0.122)  (0.163) 
Trade liberalization     0.838**  0.895** 
     (0.155)  (0.198) 
        
Summary statistics:        
Adjusted R
2 d 0.667  0.629 0.752 0.731 
No. of observations  269  424 253 408 
a. Equation 2 in the text is estimated using panel data and generalized least squares; the dependent variable is the 
average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity according to Newey and West (1987). Control variables include initial per capita income, secondary 
schooling, population growth, and life expectancy.  ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level. 
b. Sample includes MECs only. 
c. Sample includes HECs and MECs.  
d. The adjusted R
2 is likely to overestimate the share of the variance explained by our right-hand-side variables 
because of the overlapping nature of the regression. No method comparable to that of Newey and West for the 
standard errors exists for adjusting the R
2, and therefore the values need to be interpreted carefully. 
                                                 
16Since the higher moments of credit growth cannot be computed in a meaningful way when the observations are few, we 
consider only series for which we have at least ten years of data. 
17 The overlapping-windows regression captures the spirit of the model we present below for the following reason. In the risky 
equilibrium of a liberalized economy there is a probability 1 - u that a crisis will occur at time t + 1, given that a crisis does not 
occur at t. Meanwhile, in a nonliberalized economy, the probability of crisis is always zero. Therefore, according to the model, 
ten-year windows with more liberalized years should exhibit both greater negative skewness and more rapid growth than 
windows with fewer liberalized years. 
  16Table 3 reports the estimation results. Consistent with the literature, we find that, after 
controlling for the standard variables, the mean growth rate of credit has a positive effect on long-run 
GDP growth, and the variance of credit growth has a negative effect. Both variables enter significantly at 
the 5 percent level in all regressions.
18
The first key point established in table 3 is that the credit that accompanies rapid GDP growth 
is bumpy. Columns 3-1 and 3-2 show that bumpy credit markets are associated with higher growth rates 
across countries with functioning financial markets. That is, negative skewness—a bumpier growth path—
is on average associated with faster GDP growth. This estimate is significant at the 5 percent level.
19  
To interpret the estimate of 0.27 for bumpiness, consider India, which has near-zero skewness, 
and Thailand, which has a skewness of -2. A point estimate of 0.27 implies that an increase in the 
bumpiness index of 2 (from zero to -2) increases the average long-run GDP growth rate by 0.54 
percentage point a year. Is this estimate economically meaningful? To address this question, note that, 
after controlling for the standard variables, Thailand grows about 2 percentage points faster per year than 
India. Thus about a quarter of this growth differential can be attributed to credit risk taking, as measured 
by the skewness of credit growth.
20
One can interpret the negative coefficient on variance as capturing the effect of “bad” volatility 
generated by, for instance, procyclical fiscal policy.
21 Meanwhile the positive coefficient on bumpiness 
captures the “good” volatility associated with the type of risk taking that eases financial constraints and 
increases investment. Notice that a country with high variance need not have negative skewness.
22  
The second key point is that the association between bumpiness and growth does not imply 
that crises are good for growth. Crises are costly. They are the price that has to be paid in order to 
attain faster growth in the presence of credit market imperfections. To see this, consider column 3-3 in 
table 3. When the financial liberalization indicator is included in the growth regression, bumpiness 
enters with a negative sign (and is significant at the 10 percent level). In the MEC set, given that there 
is financial liberalization, the lower the incidence of crises, the better. We can see the same pattern in 
                                                 
18 The link between financial deepening and growth is well established in the literature. See, for instance, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine (2001) and Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000). See also the seminal work of McKinnon (1973). 
19 Notice that the estimated coefficient on bumpiness is not capturing country fixed effects. Recall that, for each country, 
skewness varies over time, like all other variables, as we use ten-year rolling averages. 
20 In order to deal with the possible endogeneity of the skewness variable, table B3v in Appendix B reports estimation 
results of two-stage least squares regressions using as instruments the legal origin index of La Porta et. al. (1999), as well 
as lagged values of all variables in the regression. Furthermore, table 16 reports results of regressions with fixed effects and 
of regressions excluding China and Ireland, which may be driven by other factors. Our benchmark results in column 3-2 
are robust to these different estimation methods. 
21 Ramey and Ramey (1995) and Fatas and Mihov (2002) show that fiscal policy-induced volatility is bad for economic growth. 
22 Imbs’s (2002) results are consistent with this view. 
  17the sample that includes HECs as well as MECs: the point estimate of bumpiness in column 3-4 is 
lower than that in column 3-2.
23  
Clearly, liberalization without fragility is best, but the data suggest that this combination is 
not available to MECs. Instead, the existence of contract enforceability problems implies that 
liberalization leads to higher growth because it eases financial constraints but, as a by-product, also 
induces financial fragility. Despite the rare occurrence of crises, on net, financial liberalization has led 
to more rapid long-run growth, as shown by the estimates in tables 1 and 3. 
 
3.  Identifying the Mechanism: Sectoral Asymmetries and the Boom-Bust Cycle 
We have documented statistically significant correlations between liberalization and growth; 
among liberalization, financial deepening, and bumpiness; and between the latter two and growth. But 
what mechanism underlies these links? Which way does the causation run? 
Appendix A presents a model that establishes a causal link from liberalization to financial 
deepening and GDP growth. Furthermore, the same forces that generate growth also generate financial 
fragility, which leads to rare crises. The theoretical mechanism has unambiguous implications for the 
behavior of credit and the ratio of N-sector to T-sector output. Testing whether these predictions are 
confirmed by the data will help identify the direction of causation. 
We start by describing the model intuitively. We then explain how the model accounts for the 
main features of the typical boom-bust cycle experienced by MECs, and after that we test the predictions 
of the model regarding the N-to-T output ratio. Finally, we discuss why the evidence strongly supports the 
view that causation goes from liberalization to growth and not the other way around. 
 
The Mechanism  
We consider a two-sector economy in which there are asymmetries in financing opportunities 
across sectors. T-sector firms have perfect access to international capital markets. Meanwhile, N-sector 
financing is subject to two credit market imperfections: contract enforceability problems and systemic 
bailout guarantees. 
Enforceability problems arise because managers of N-sector firms cannot commit to repaying 
debt: they are able to divert funds to themselves by incurring a cost. As a result, in the model, lenders 
impose on each N-sector firm a borrowing constraint that is proportional to its cash flow. This setup 
captures the fact that, across MECs, T-sector firms can, in general, access international capital markets 
more easily than most N-sector firms. The latter are financially constrained and dependent on domestic 
                                                 
23 The reason why bumpiness enters with a positive sign in the fourth column is that all HECs are liberalized and have near zero 
  18bank credit (except for the largest firms, which are in telecommunications, energy and finance).
24 Since 
trade and financial liberalization have typically not been accompanied by judicial reform, enforceability 
problems have remained. Thus liberalization has exacerbated the asymmetric financing opportunities 
across sectors. 
The second imperfection found in MECs is that financial liberalization not only lifts 
restrictions that preclude risk taking but also is associated with explicit and implicit bailout guarantees that 
protect creditors against the effects of systemic crises. Because domestic banks have been the prime 
beneficiaries of these guarantees, this has created incentives for investors to use domestic banks to channel 
resources to firms that cannot pledge international collateral. Thus liberalization has resulted in biased 
capital inflows. T-sector firms and very large N-sector firms are the recipients of FDI and portfolio flows, 
whereas most of the inflows that end up in the N-sector are intermediated through domestic banks, which 
enjoy systemic bailout guarantees.  
A key result of the model is that systemic guarantees may induce banks and their clients to 
take on credit risk, but they do not eliminate borrowing constraints. Why does this happen? Systemic 
guarantees are promises to step in and repay debt obligations only in case of widespread insolvencies. If 
there is systemic risk in the economy, agents can exploit the subsidy implicit in the guarantees by 
undertaking credit risk. If a borrower defaults in a state of the world where many other borrowers are also 
defaulting, lenders will get repaid in full by the bailout agency. Because the market anticipates this 
contingent subsidy, taking on credit risk reduces the cost of capital. Thus borrowers will find it profitable 
to take on credit risk if the probability of insolvency is small enough. At the same time, guarantees do not 
neutralize enforceability problems, and thus borrowing constraints are not eliminated. This is because a 
bailout is not granted when only a few borrowers default.
25
How is this systemic risk generated? Over the past few decades, credit risk has become 
common in bank and corporate balance sheets in MECs in the form of short maturities and currency 
mismatches. As a result, an important share of banks’ liabilities is denominated in foreign currency, 
whereas their assets are either denominated in domestic currency or are loans to the N-sector. If a reversal 
of capital inflows were to occur, there would be a real depreciation, fire sales, and a meltdown of bank 
balance sheets. It is in these circumstances that bailouts are generally granted. In other words, the 
                                                                                                                                                                
skewness. Thus, negative skewness acts like a dummy that selects MECs that have liberalized financially. 
24 There are several reasons why T-sector firms can access international financial markets more easily than N-sector firms. For 
instance, since T-sector firms tend to export, they can more easily establish long-term relationships with foreign firms, and they 
can pledge export receivables as collateral. Also, on average, T-sector firms are larger than N-sector firms. 
25 This is why it is important to distinguish systemic from unconditional guarantees, which are granted whenever there is an 
individual default. Notice that if all guarantees were unconditional, enforceability problems would not generate borrowing 
constraints, because a bailout would be granted whenever there is a single default, regardless of the state of the world. The 
results in this paragraph are proved in Schneider and Tornell (forthcoming). 
  19interaction of contract enforceability problems and systemic bailout guarantees sets in motion a self-
reinforcing mechanism. On the one hand, the expectation of real exchange rate variability makes it 
optimal for agents to denominate debt in foreign currency and run the risk of going bankrupt. On the other 
hand, the resulting currency mismatch at the aggregate level makes the real exchange rate variable, 
validating agents’ expectations.
26  
We have seen that, in the presence of contract enforceability problems, the credit of most N-
sector firms is constrained by their cash flow, even though there are bailout guarantees. This happens 
because guarantees are systemic, so that lenders will lend only as much as they are sure that the borrower 
will be willing to repay. A second key observation is that taking on credit risk reduces expected debt 
repayments because the bailout agency will cover part of the debt obligation in the event of a systemic 
crisis. Thus the bailout guarantee allows financially constrained firms to borrow more than they could 
otherwise. This increase in borrowing and investment is accompanied by an increase in credit risk. When 
many firms take on credit risk, aggregate financial fragility rises, together with N-sector investment and 
growth. 
Faster N-sector growth helps the T-sector grow faster because N-sector goods are used in T-
sector production. Therefore the T-sector will enjoy more abundant and cheaper inputs than otherwise. As 
a result, as long as a crisis does not occur, growth in a risky economy is faster than in a safe one. This does 
not, however, guarantee that, in the long run, average growth in a risky economy is also faster than in a 
safe one, because financial fragility implies that a self-fulfilling crisis may occur, in which case GDP 
growth will fall. 
As we show in appendix A, if crises are rare events, average long-run growth will be faster 
along a risky path than along a safe path unless the costs of a crisis are excessively high. In fact, if crises 
were not rare, agents would not find it profitable to take on credit risk in the first place. This explains why 
financial fragility leads to faster mean GDP growth. 
The argument has thus established a joint causal link: financial liberalization promotes both 
long-run growth and financial fragility. Since, in any equilibrium, crises both are rare and result in an 
abrupt and drastic fall in credit, which recuperates only gradually, credit growth will be negatively skewed 
if the time sample is long enough. Thus negative skewness of credit growth is a symptom of financial 
fragility. This explains why skewness of credit growth is a valid right-hand-side variable in the regressions 
we estimate. 
Before moving on to the other predictions of the model, we emphasize that both guarantees 
and enforceability problems are essential to the argument. If there were no guarantees, agents would not 
                                                 
26 From a theoretical perspective, several other self-reinforcing mechanisms link credit risk with aggregate financial fragility. 
  20be willing to take on credit risk to claim the implicit subsidy. Alternatively, if contract enforceability 
problems were not severe enough, borrowing constraints would not arise in equilibrium, and if 
enforceability problems were too severe, firms could not attain enough leverage, and systemic risk would 
not arise. To link these remarks to the data, we note that explicit and implicit systemic bailout guarantees 
are present in most countries. They capture the “too big to fail” principle: when a systemic meltdown 
occurs, governments tend to grant bailouts.
27 The degree of contract enforceability varies from country to 
country. We have identified those countries where contract enforceability problems are not too severe as 
those where the stock market turnover-to-GDP ratio was greater than 1 percent in 1998. We partition this 
set into countries with either a high or a medium degree of contract enforceability (HECs and MECs) as 
described earlier. The mechanism we have described is operative only in the MEC set.  
 
The Boom-Bust Cycle and the Bottleneck Effect 
In addition to helping us identify the mechanism that links liberalization, fragility, and long-
run growth, an attractive feature of our approach is that it can account for higher-frequency phenomena, 
such as the boom-bust cycles typically experienced by MECs, and the bottleneck effect. This will allow 
us, in the next section, to evaluate the Mexican performance. 
We represent the typical boom-bust cycle by means of an event study. Figure 6 shows the 
average behavior, across our set of thirty-five MECs, of several macroeconomic variables around twin 
currency and banking crises during the period 1980-99. Year 0 refers to the year during which twin 
currency and banking crises take place.
28 In each panel the heavy line represents the average deviation 
relative to tranquil times, the dotted lines represent the 95 percent confidence interval, and the thin lines 
correspond to Mexico.
29  
                                                                                                                                                                
We focus on currency mismatches because they capture the recent experience of MECs. 
27 One might argue that, in the aftermath of crises, guarantees cease to exist temporarily (for instance, because of fiscal 
constraints). However, after a few years they come back. One might also argue that regulations precluding fraud or extreme risk 
taking might be imposed as a result of a crisis. In terms of the model of appendix A, we would say that, in that case, systemic 
guarantees are still in place, but either regulations do not allow agents to exploit them or there is a shift in expectations in the 
wake of the crisis (that is, agents believe that others will not take on credit risk, and so a meltdown and hence a bailout cannot 
take place in the next period). 
28 We say that there is a twin crisis at year 0 if both a currency and a banking crisis occur during that year, or if one occurs at 
year 0 and the other at year 1. 
29 The graphs are the visual representations of the point estimates and standard errors from regressions in which the variable 
depicted in the graph is the dependent variable, regressed on time dummies preceding and following a crisis. We estimate the 
following pooled regression:  
yit = ai + Σβj Dummyτ+j + εit, 
where y is the variable of interest in the graph; i = 1, …, 35 denotes the country; t = 1980, …, 1999; and Dummyτ+j equals 1 at 
time τ + j and zero otherwise, where τ is a crisis year. The panel data estimations account for differences in the mean by 
allowing for fixed effects, as well as for differences in the variance by using a generalized least squares estimator, using the 
estimated cross-sectional residual variances. 
  21Figure 6: The Boom-Bust Cycle of the average MEC 
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Typically, before a crisis there is a real appreciation and a lending boom, during which credit 
grows unusually fast. During the crisis there is a drastic real depreciation, which coincides with a 
meltdown of the banking system, widespread insolvencies, and fire sales. In the aftermath of the crisis 
there is typically a short-lived recession and a fall in credit that is both sharper and longer-lasting than the 
fall in GDP. Thus the credit-to-GDP ratio declines.  
The milder fall in aggregate GDP than in credit masks the asymmetric sectoral response we 
emphasize in this paper: N-sector output falls more than T-sector output in the wake of a crisis and 
recuperates more sluggishly thereafter. This asymmetry is also present during the boom that precedes the 
crisis, as the N-sector grows faster than the T-sector and a real appreciation occurs.
30 Finally, the figure 
also shows that investment fluctuations are quite pronounced along the boom-bust cycle, whereas those of 
consumption are not.  
The model can account for these features because financial constraints and credit risk (in the 
form of currency mismatches) coexist in equilibrium, and their interaction generates real exchange rate 
variability. In a risky equilibrium, currency mismatch is optimal and borrowing constraints bind, so that 
there can be a self-fulfilling, steep real depreciation that generates widespread bankruptcies of N-sector 
firms and the banks that lend to them. Because N-sector net worth falls drastically and recuperates only 
gradually, there is a collapse in credit and N-sector investment, which take a long time to recuperate. 
Since T-sector firms do not face financial constraints, and the real depreciation allows them to buy inputs 
at fire-sale prices, this leads to rapid growth of T-sector output and GDP in the wake of the crisis. As a 
result, the N-to-T output ratio falls drastically and recuperates sluggishly. 
                                                 
30 This asymmetric sectoral response parallels the  regressions using the N-to-T output ratio in the previous subsection. 
  23However, rapid GDP growth cannot be sustained over a long period if it is driven only by T-
sector growth, because T-sector production needs inputs from the N-sector. If the credit crunch continues 
for a long period, depressed N-sector investment eventually leads to bottlenecks: the T-sector no longer 
enjoys an abundant and cheap supply of N-sector inputs, and its growth starts falling. This is the 
bottleneck effect, which implies that sustainable growth cannot be supported only by export growth. This 




We have shown that, in MECs, T-sector firms can in general access international markets and 
overcome these problems more easily than N-sector firms. This asymmetry in financing opportunities 
imposes restrictions on the behavior of credit and the response of the N-to-T output ratio to various 
shocks. Testing whether these restrictions are present in data from MECs will help us identify the 
mechanism that links liberalization and long-run growth.
 
First, consider the response of the N-to-T output ratio to trade and financial liberalization. 
Since trade liberalization benefits mostly T-sector firms and allows them to establish financing channels in 
international markets, the N-to-T output ratio should decrease following trade liberalization. Because 
financial liberalization is typically followed by a lending boom that benefits the financially constrained N-
sector relatively more than the T-sector, the N-to-T output ratio should increase following financial 
liberalization. 
Second, consider the response of the N-to-T output ratio to a crisis. The sharp real depreciation 
that occurs during crises worsens the balance sheets of the N-sector firms and leads to fire sales, which 
benefit the T-sector at the expense of the N-sector. Thus, the N-to-T output ratio falls in the wake of 
crises. Because N-sector credit is constrained by the sector’s net worth, and because it takes a long time 
for that net worth to recover, the N-to-T output ratio might continue to fall for a prolonged period. 
Third, because the N-sector is more financially constrained than the T-sector, and banks are 
highly exposed to the N-sector, the N-to-T ratio should move together with credit in normal times and 
should collapse together with credit during crises. 
                                                 
31 The fact that T-sector production uses N-sector inputs is key. This is an essential difference between our model and the 
standard dependent-economy model, where the linkage between the N- and the T-sectors derives from the fact that both use the 
same nonreproducible factor. In such a model, rapid N-sector growth does not cause rapid T-sector growth, and there is no 
bottleneck effect. In the short run, a shock that negatively affects the N-sector’s investment and output generates a real 
depreciation and benefits the T-sector in both models. In the medium run the predictions of the two models differ. In our model 
the T-sector will suffer a bottleneck as N-sector inputs become scarce. This is not the case in the dependent-economy model. 
  24To test whether these patterns are present in the data, we construct two different indexes of N-
sector and T-sector production for our set of countries. We then estimate regressions of the following 
form: 




jcrisisi,t+j + εit,  
where N/Tit is the N-to-T output ratio in country i at time t; creditit is real credit growth; TLit and FLit equal 
1 if there has been trade or financial liberalization, respectively, in country i in or before year t, and zero 
otherwise; and crisisi,t+j equals 1 in country i and year t + j, where t denotes the year when twin banking 
and currency crises occur in country i, and j denotes the number of years after the crisis.
32
 
Table 4. Regressions Testing for Sectoral Asymmetries 
 
Independent  variable  4-1 4-2 4-3 
Financial  liberalization  1.147** 0.989** 1.007** 
  (0.140) (0.148) (0.141) 
Trade  liberalization  -0.780** -0.581** -0.782** 
  (0.189) (0.198) (0.203) 
Credit   0.481**  0.440** 
   (0.205)  (0.192) 
Rate of real depreciation      2.233** 
     (1.372) 
Crisis year dummy  -0.243*  -0.205*  -0.274** 
  (0.143) (0.125) (0.121) 
Crisis year +1  -2.434**  -2.124**  -2.228** 
  (0.143) (0.184) (0.177) 
Crisis year +2  0.193*  0.439**  0.370** 
  (0.127) (0.155) (0.147) 
Crisis year +3  -0.793**  -0.652**  -0.693** 
  (0.127) (0.130) (0.122) 
Crisis year +4  -0.499**  -0.248  -0.348* 
  (0.192) (0.204) (0.194) 
Crisis year +5  0.872**  0.837**  0.916** 
  (0.183) (0.162) (0.154) 
     
Summary statistics:     
Adjusted R
2 0.655 0.728 0.734 
No. of observations  443  426  360 
a. Equation 3 in the text is estimated using panel data and generalized least squares; the dependent variable is the ratio 
of nontradables sector output to tradables sector output. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * indicates 
significance at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level. 
 
Our first N-to-T output index is used in table 4. This index is constructed by looking at the 
behavior of the sectoral exports-to-GDP ratio. We consider construction, manufacturing, and services, and 
for each country we classify as the tradable sector the one of these three in which this ratio is the highest, 
and as nontradable the one in which the ratio is lowest. In appendix B we consider another index based on 
                                                 
32 Rajan and Zingales (1998) examine the sectors in the United States that use external finance more intensively than others. 
They then test whether these same sectors have grown faster in countries that have experienced greater financial deepening. 
  25the variability of the sectoral real exchange rate. The correlation between both indexes is 0.74, and the 
results of regressions using the two indexes are very similar.  
We estimate equation 3 using the MEC sample in a panel data regression that includes fixed 
effects and uses a generalized least squares estimator. The sample covers the period from 1980 to 1999 
with annual data. Column 4-1 in table 4 shows that, across MECs, the N-to-T output ratio responds in the 
way predicted by the model. The liberalization variables are significant at the 5 percent level in all 
regressions. The estimates show that the N-to-T output index falls following trade liberalization, whereas 
it increases following financial liberalization. The table also shows that the N-to-T output index falls in the 
wake of a crisis. The strongest effect is observed in the first period after the eruption of the crisis. After a 
small rebound in period t + 2, the index continues to fall until t + 4. 
Consider now the link between bank credit and the N-to-T output ratio. As column 4-2 of table 
4 shows, credit growth enters with a positive sign and is significant at the 5 percent level. This indicates 
that the co-movement of credit and the N-to-T output ratio is not conditional on the occurrence of either a 
crisis or policy reform. To control for the fact that the ratio can move in response to other shocks that 
generate movements in the real exchange rate, we also estimate equation 3 including the rate of real 
depreciation as an explanatory variable. As column 4-3 shows, both liberalization variables and credit 
remain significant at the 5 percent level when this variable is included. The crisisi,t+j dummies enter 
significantly at the 5 percent level in almost all cases. 
An alternative way to examine the close link between the N-to-T output ratio and credit growth 
is through vector autoregressions (VARs). If we impose the restriction that output within a quarter is 
predetermined by past investment, and thus does not respond to variations in credit, our model implies that 
we can run bivariate VARs of credit with the N-to-T output ratio, or of credit with GDP. Figure 7 shows 
the impulse responses of the N-to-T output ratio and GDP to a 1-standard-deviation shock to real credit 
growth in Mexico and the United States. The contrast is impressive. In Mexico both GDP and the N-to-T 
output ratio react significantly to a credit shock even when the effects of crisis and liberalization are 
accounted for.
33
By contrast, in the United States the effect of credit on GDP is only mildly significant and 
negligible in magnitude. Similarly, the effect on the N-to-T output ratio in the United States is smaller 
than in Mexico and not statistically significant. This difference is consistent with the view that contract 
enforceability problems are more severe in Mexico than in the United States. T-sector firms can overcome 
these problems, but most N-sector firms cannot, and this asymmetry is reflected in a strong response of the 
                                                 
33 The crisis and liberalization dates have been dummied out in the VARs. 
  26N-to-T output ratio. Furthermore, this effect is strong enough to be reflected in aggregate GDP, which is 
the sum of N-sector and T-sector production. 
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Note: The heavy lines trace the response of Mexico and the USA to a one-standard deviation shock in credit. 
Calculations are based on two-variable VARs, including credit and either GDP or the N-to-T output ratio. Each VAR 
is estimated from quarterly data in growth rates over the sample period from 1980:1 to 1999:4, allowing for 4 lags, a 
time trend and dummy variables for liberalization and the crisis. Finite sample critical values are generated by 1000 
Monte Carlo replications. 
 
Are Other Mechanisms Consistent with the Data? 
We have presented a mechanism (based on the model presented in appendix A) in which 
causation runs from liberalization to growth, with financial fragility arising as a by-product: liberalization 
allows the undertaking of credit risk by financially constrained firms, most of which are in the N-sector. 
This eases borrowing constraints and increases GDP growth, but it also generates endogenous financial 
fragility. Thus a liberalized economy will experience occasional self-fulfilling crises, during which a real 
depreciation coincides with sharp falls in the credit-to-GDP and N-to-T output ratios, as financially 
constrained N-sector firms are hit especially hard. 
  27This mechanism implies, first, that credit growth and the credit-to-GDP ratio are negatively 
skewed, experiencing sharp falls during the occasional crisis; second, that the N-to-T output ratio 
collapses during crises and moves in tandem with credit in normal times; and third, that the N-to-T output 
ratio responds positively to financial liberalization and negatively to trade liberalization. Our data analysis 
has shown that MECs have all these predicted characteristics. 
Would we observe this behavior of credit and the N-to-T output ratio if causation went in 
another direction, or if financial constraints did not play a key role? Consider, for instance, an alternative 
view in which faster GDP growth causes liberalization and an increase in capital inflows and in credit 
growth. In such a framework, faster GDP growth would lead to a higher N-to-T output ratio following 
financial liberalization, to a greater incidence of crises, and to a protracted decline in the ratio in the wake 
of a crisis. We are not aware of any argument in which the causation runs from GDP growth to 
liberalization and financial fragility that is also able to explain these patterns and a negatively skewed 
credit growth path.
34
Liberalization may increase long-run growth by improving the quality of institutions, for 
instance through a discipline effect that induces structural reforms that improve property rights and reduce 
taxation.
35 This channel does not generate financial fragility, and it can work side by side with the 
mechanism we have identified here.
36
Finally, the asymmetry in financing opportunities between the N- and T-sectors is key to our 
argument. In the next section we provide evidence from microlevel data from the Mexican economic 
census and stock market supporting this sectoral asymmetry.
37
 
4.  Capital Flows 
During the last two decades, capital inflows to MECs have increased enormously, and so has 
the importance of private flows (figure 8). In the average MEC the share of private flows has increased 
from 60 percent in the mid-1980s to more than 90 percent by the end of the 1990s. 
FDI is considered a “good” form of capital inflow, whereas bank flows are considered “bad” 
because they are foreign loans to domestic banks. Such loans are risky because of the currency mismatch. 
                                                 
34 Consider, for instance, the traditional dependent-economy model where the N- and T-sectors use a common, nonreproducible 
factor (such as labor or land) and where there are no credit market imperfections. There is no force in such an economy that 
would lead to a greater incidence of crises following financial liberalization, generate a negatively skewed credit growth 
distribution, or generate a protracted decline in the N-to-T output ratio in the wake of a crisis. 
35 As in Tornell and Velasco (1992). 
36On this point see Kaminski and Schmukler (2002), Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000), and Loayza and Ranciere (2002). 
37 Tornell and Westermann (2003) also provide evidence for this sectoral asymmetry for a set of MECs by looking at survey 
data from the World Bank. 
  28Figure 8: Capital Inflows  
















































































































































































Mexico, total Mexico, private  
Mill. US$.  Mill. US$. 
 
Note: The figures show the total accumulated financial inflows in Mill. US$. 
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
 
Figure 9: Components of Private Capital Inflows 
 




























































































FDI Portfolio Investment Banks  
Mill. US$.  Mill. US$. 
 
Note: Banks include commercial and development banks 
Source: IFS, IMF and Bank of Mexico 
 
Several observers have noted that one reason why financial liberalization has led to financial 
fragility is that an important share of capital inflows takes the form of bank flows. Many have argued that 
the greater the share of inflows in the form of FDI and the lower the share of bank credit, the lower is 
financial fragility. To evaluate this argument we must keep in mind a key fact overlooked by the literature. 
  29Stylized fact 5.  The lion’s share of FDI is directed mostly to the T-sector or to financial institutions. 
 
This is illustrated in Table 5. Because the nonfinancial N-sector receives a small share of 
FDI, bank flows remain the main source of external finance for most N-sector firms. Since this group 
of firms is financially constrained, a reduction in risky bank flows and credit may mean that N-sector 
investment and growth will fall. As there are productive linkages throughout the economy, the 
unconstrained T-sector will also be negatively affected. Hence it is possible that the net effect of 
banning risky bank flows is to reduce long-run GDP growth. Here again we see that, in the presence of 




Table 5. FDI Originating in the USA in 1998  
 
 N  T  F 
All countries  0.260  0.275  0.465 
HECs 0.260  0.232  0.508 
MECs 0.265  0.416  0.319 
Mexico 0.154  0.592  0.255 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
 
6.  Lessons and Conclusions 
We have shown that trade liberalization is typically followed by financial liberalization, 
which leads to lending booms and occasional financial crises. On net, however, both trade and 
financial liberalization have led to faster long-run growth across the set of countries with functioning 
financial markets. 
We have presented a model that establishes a causal link from liberalization to growth. 
Trade liberalization promotes efficiency and growth mainly in the tradables sector. Financial 
liberalization adds even more to growth because it eases financing constraints, leading to an increase 
in investment by financially constrained firms, most of which are in the nontradables sector. However, 
the easing of financing constraints takes place through the undertaking of credit risk, which leads to 
financial fragility and occasional crises. 
                                                 
38 We do not analyze here how the new theories of FDI account for the stylized fact that the largest share of nonfinancial FDI is 
allocated to the T-sector. Vertical motives for FDI involve fragmentation of production across countries (Markusen, 2002). 
Horizontal motives for FDI imply that firms invest abroad when the gains from avoiding trade costs outweigh the costs of 
maintaining capacity in a foreign country. Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2003) test this theory using U.S. data and find that the 
least productive firms serve only the domestic market, that relatively more productive firms export, and that the most 
productive firms engage in FDI. A third theory, based on the role of information in driving FDI, might also help account for this 
fact (Mody, Razin, and Sadka, 2003). 
  30We conclude with a list of seven lessons. First, although several observers have claimed 
that financial liberalization is not good for growth because of the crises associated with it, this is the 
wrong lesson to draw. Our empirical analysis shows that, across countries with functioning financial 
markets, financial liberalization leads to faster average long-run growth, even though it also leads to 
occasional crises. This gain in growth is over and above the gain derived from trade liberalization.  
A second, closely related, lesson is that the growth-enhancing financial deepening that 
follows liberalization is not a smooth process. Rather, it takes place through boom-bust cycles. 
Occasional crises are the price that has to be paid to attain faster growth in the presence of severe 
contract enforceability problems. The first-best solution is to implement judicial reform and improve 
contract enforceability. In the absence of such reforms, liberalization permits financially constrained 
firms to attain greater leverage and invest more, at the cost of undertaking credit risk. Credit risk 
creates an environment of rapid growth and financial fragility. 
Third, to analyze the effects of liberalization it is not sufficient to look at aggregate data 
alone. Sectoral asymmetries play a key role: many tradables (T-) sector firms have access to 
international capital markets, whereas most nontradables (N-) sector firms are financially constrained 
and depend on banks for their financing. Trade liberalization and agreements such as NAFTA promote 
faster productivity growth in the T-sector but are of little direct help to the N-sector. Financial 
liberalization leads to an increase in international bank flows, which allows financially constrained 
firms to borrow more. Since many of these firms are in the N-sector, a currency mismatch on firms’ 
balance sheets develops, making the economy prone to self-fulfilling crises. In short, financial 
liberalization generates crises in countries with contract enforcement problems because financial 
liberalization is associated with international lending to the N-sector. 
We agree with the general view that FDI is the safest form of capital inflow. Our fourth 
lesson, however, is that FDI does not obviate the need for risky international bank flows. FDI goes 
mostly to T-sector firms and financial institutions. As a result, bank flows are practically the only 
source of external finance for most N-sector firms. Curtailing such risky flows would reduce N-sector 
investment and generate bottlenecks that would limit long-run growth. Bank flows are hardly to be 
recommended, but for most firms it might be that or nothing. Clearly, allowing risky capital flows 
does not mean that anything goes. Appropriate prudential regulation must also be in place.  
Fifth, it is possible for GDP growth to recover rapidly from a crisis. Sustainable growth, 
however, cannot be assured unless the banking problem is fixed. Recovery in aggregate activity is 
typically not uniform across the economy. The tradables sector may grow strongly while the 
nontradables sector recuperates only sluggishly. This asymmetric response is intimately linked to a 
  31severe credit crunch that hits the N-sector particularly hard and that goes hand in hand with a steady 
increase in the share of nonperforming loans. 
A sixth lesson is that crises are part of the growth process in financially liberalized 
countries with contract enforcement problems. At the “tipping point,” beyond which it is unlikely that 
capital outflows will reverse, authorities should focus on what to do after the crisis instead of 
attempting to forestall the crisis. Delaying an inevitable crisis will tend to make the effects of the full-
blown crisis far worse, as attested by the experiences of Mexico in 1994 and Argentina in 2001. 
Finally, one can draw a lesson for empirical implementation. Statistical variance is not a 
good instrument with which to identify financial fragility. Fragility is associated with infrequent but 
severe crises and therefore with both high variance and negative skewness. High variance, however, 
may reflect high-frequency shocks, which may be exogenous or self-inflicted, for instance by bad 
economic policy. Negative skewness tests specifically for infrequent crises. Our argument has shown 
that infrequent crises are a by-product of a rapid-growth path. 
 
  32Appendix A
The Model
Here, we formalize the intuitive argument of Section 3 and show that it is indeed part
of an internally consistent story. The equilibrium will establish a causal link from ﬁnancial
liberalization to ﬁnancial fragility, and from the latter to credit and GDP growth. Also, it
will impose restrictions on the sample of countries over which the mechanism is operative,
and on the behavior of credit and the N-to-T output ratio. The model is based on Schneider
and Tornell (2003), and Ranciere, Tornell and Westermann (2003).60
We consider a simple dynamic general equilibrium model of an economy with two sectors:
a tradables (T) sector that produces the consumption good, and a nontradables (N) sector
that produces an intermediate good which is used as an input in the production of both
goods.57 As we shall see, the fact that the N-sector demands its own goods is key for
ﬁnancial fragility to arise in equilibrium. The assumption that T-production uses N-inputs
is key to generate the bottleneck eﬀect and to link ﬁnancial fragility to higher GDP growth.58
W ew i l ld e n o t et h er e l a t i v ep r i c eo fN - g o o d s( i . e . ,t h ei n v e r s eo ft h er e a le x c h a n g er a t e )b y
pt = pN
t /pT
t .59 T-goods are produced using a nontradable input (dt) according to yt = atdα
t ,











60The model combines elements of the ﬁnancial accelerator framework (Bernanke, et. al. (2000)) with
elements of third-generation BoP crises models. See for instance, Aghion, et.al. (2000), Burnside, et.al.
(2000), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (1999), Calvo (1998), Chang and Velasco (1998), Corsetti, et.al.
(1999), Krugman (1999), Mckinnon and Pill (1998), and Tirole (2002).
57The assumption that N-goods are demanded by the N-sector is necessary to get ﬁnancial fragility in
equilibrium. The assumption that T-production uses N-inputs will allows us to formalize the bottleneck
eﬀect and to link ﬁnancial fragility to higher GDP growth.
58Since the economy is small and open, the destination of T-goods is not important for our argument.
59Betts and Kehoe (2001) ﬁnd that in a set of 52 countries over the period 1980-2000 real exchange rate
variations reﬂect mainly changes in the relative price of N and T goods, not movements in the international
relative prices of T-goods. Among some developed countries the latter channel is more important (Engel
(1999)).
33N-goods are produced using N-goods as inputs (It) according to
qt+1 = θIt (5)
The investable funds of an N-ﬁrm consist of the debt it issues (Bt) plus its cash ﬂow (wt).
The ﬁrm’s budget constraint, in terms of T-goods, is thus
ptIt = wt + Bt (6)
In order to allow for the possibility of ﬁnancial fragility we assume that there are two one-
period debt instruments. N-debt (bn
t ), that promises to repay in N-goods: pt+1(1 + ρn
t )bn
t ;
and T-debt (bt)t h a tp r o m i s e st or e p a yi nT - g o o d s :(1 + ρt)bt. We can interpret T(N)-debt
as foreign(domestic) currency denominated debt. As we shall see, the price may take two
values in equilibrium. Since ﬁrms produce N-goods, N-debt is a perfect hedge, while T-debt
may be risky.
In modeling the N-sector we will make two assumptions to capture key features of MECs
discussed in Section 3. First, N-sector ﬁnancing is subject to contract enforceability prob-
lems. Second, there are systemic bailout guarantees that cover lenders against systemic
meltdowns.60 We follow Schneider and Tornell (2003) and model the contract enforceabil-
ity problem by assuming that ﬁrms are run by dynasties of two-period lived managers that
cannot commit to repay debt: if at time t the young manager incurs a non-pecuniary cost
h[wt+Bt], then at t+1s h ew i l lb ea b l et od i v e r ta l lt h er e t u r n sp r o v i d e dt h eﬁrm is solvent.61
Lenders only ﬁnance plans that do not lead to diversion. Thus, when deciding whether to
lend they take into account that the goal of every manager is to maximize next period’s
expected proﬁts net of diversion costs.
60Recall the distinction between unconditional and sy s t e m i cg u a r a n t e e sw em a d ee a r l i e r .I fa l ld e b tw e r e
covered by unconditional bailout guarantees, then the enforceability problem would become irrelevant and
borrowing constraints would not arise in equilibrium.
61We can think of N-ﬁrms as banks that lend to the N-sector. This captures the fact that in MECs banks
are heavily exposed to the N-sector. The banking system is the channel through which capital inﬂows reach
the N-sector and also is the weak link during crises.
34The ﬁrm is solvent next period if revenues qt+1pt+1 are no lower than the promised debt
repayment Lt+1 plus the young manager’s wage (1−β)pt+1qt+1. In this case the old manager
distributes the remaining proﬁts, πt+1 = βqt+1pt+1−Lt+1, as a dividend to herself. To capture
the costs of ﬁnancial meltdowns we assume that under insolvency a large share 1 − µw of
revenues are dissipated, the young manager gets a small amount of seed money µwpt+1qt+1,
with µw < 1 − β, and the old manager gets zero. Lenders get Lt+1 if a bailout is granted
and zero otherwise. Since guarantees are systemic, bailouts are paid out if and only if many
borrowers go bust. For concreteness, we assume that there is a bailout agency that repays
lenders 100% of what they were promised (Lt) if a majority of borrowers goes bust.62
To close the description of the economy we note that the real exchange rate is determined
by the N-goods market clearing condition
dt(pt)+It(pt)=qt(It−1) (7)
Since there are no exogenous shocks, the only source of risk is endogenous real exchange rate
variability. As we shall see, there are equilibria where (7) holds at two values of pt: ¯ pt+1 if
ﬁrms are solvent or p
t+1 if they are insolvent.63
Trade and ﬁnancial liberalization will mean a reduction in impediments to trade goods
and assets, rather than a shift away from autarky. In a ﬁnancially non-liberalized economy
there are regulations that preclude agents from taking on credit risk that might lead to
insolvency. Since the only source of risk is real exchange rate variability, this is equivalent to
allowing agents to issue only N-debt. Financial liberalization eliminates these regulations,
so agents can issue both types of debt. As we shall see, liberalization will lead to currency
mismatch and lending booms that end in busts. The eﬀects of trade liberalization are not
the focus of the model. Since these reforms typically increase T-sector eﬃciency, they can
62Here we do not analyse how the cost of the subsidy implicit in the guarantees is paid for. This cost could
be ﬁnanced by domestic taxation if we assumed that T-goods were produced using a ﬁxed factor. In this
case the cost of the subsidy would be paid for by taxing this ﬁxed factor. This is done by Ranciere, et.al.
(2003).
63There are multiple self-fulﬁlling equilibria as in Cole and Kehoe (2000) and Obstfeld (1986).
35be represented by an increase in the productivity parameter at in (4). To isolate the eﬀects
of ﬁnancial liberalization we will set at to one.64
Financing and Investment Decisions. Consider ﬁrst a non-liberalized economy.
Since lenders are risk neutral and the opportunity cost of capital is 1+r, the interest rate
that they require satisﬁes [1 + ρn
t ]Et(pt+1)=1+r. Furthermore, to avoid diversion by the
ﬁrm, lenders impose a borrowing constraint: (1 + r)bn
t ≤ h(wt + bn
t ). If investment yields a
return which is higher than the opportunity cost of capital, the ﬁrm will borrow up to an
amount that makes the credit constraint binding. Thus, budget constraint (6) implies that















Notice that a necessary condition for borrowing constraints to arise is h<1+r. If h, the
index of contract enforceability, were greater than the cost of capital, it would always be
cheaper to repay debt rather than to divert. Thus, lenders will not impose a ceiling on the
amount they are willing to lend and agents will not be ﬁnancially constrained. This is why
in the empirical part we diﬀerentiate high-h from low-h countries.
Consider now a liberalized economy. Firms can now choose between N- and T-debt. If
there is enough real exchange rate variability, T-debt is risky and it might lead to insolvency:
π(p
t+1)=βp
t+1qt+1−(1+ρt)bt < 0. A ﬁrm might choose T-debt and risk insolvency because
risky T-debt is cheaper than safe N-debt. To see why suppose for a moment that tomorrow’s
real exchange rate can take on two values. With probability u it takes an appreciated value
(¯ pt+1) that leaves every ﬁrm solvent, while with probability 1−u it takes a depreciated value
(p
t+1) that makes all N-sector ﬁrms go bust and generates a crisis. Since lenders constrain
credit to ensure that borrowers will repay in the no-crisis state, it follows that in the no-crisis
64Clearly, in the real world ﬁnancial liberalization opens the possibility for agents to take on credit risk
in many other ways than by just allowing them to choose a risky debt instrument. Here, we capture this
in a parsimonious way that allows us to obtain closed-form solutions, which in turn allows us to make clear
why in an economy with credit market imperfections ﬁnancial liberalization leads to higher growth only if it
leads to fragility.
36state debt is repaid in full and there is no bailout. Meanwhile, in the crisis state there is
bankruptcy and each lender receives a bailout equal to what he was promised. Thus, the





follows that choosing T-debt over N-debt reduces the cost of capital from 1+r to [1 + r]u.
Lower expected debt repayments, in turn, ease the borrowing constraint as lenders will lend
up to an amount that equates u[1 + r]bt to h[wt + bt]. Therefore, credit and investment are:
bt =[ m








By comparing (9) with (8) we can see that:
Result 1. In the presence of systemic bailout guarantees, risky currency mismatch allows
agents to reduce the expected value of debt repayments, which eases borrowing con-
straints and increases the investment multiplier: mr >m s.
This increase in leverage is possible because systemic guarantees mean that in a crisis
lenders expect to be bailed out. The fact that T-debt is cheaper than N-debt does not imply
that agents will always be willing to issue T-debt. This is because with probability 1 − u
T-debt will result in bankruptcy for a borrower. One can show that it is individually optimal











This condition ensures that in the good state returns are high enough to make the production
of N-goods proﬁtable, and that in the bad state there is a critical mass of insolvencies so
that lenders will be bailed out.65 Next, we investigate when it is that currency mismatch
generates price sequences that satisfy (10).
Equilibria. In the two economies we have considered investment is given by It = mt
wt
pt
and and cash ﬂow equals the representative manager’s wage: wt =( 1− βt)ptqt, where βt
65For a derivation of this result see Schneider and Tornell (2003).
37equals β under solvency and µw under insolvency. Thus, the market clearing condition (7)
implies that in any equilibrium
It = φtqt, φt =[ 1− βt]mt, (11)
where the investment multiplier mt can take the value ms or mr. Combining (11) with (4) and
(5) we have that in a symmetric equilibrium N-output, prices and T-output evolve according
to
qt = θφt−1qt−1 (12a)
pt = α[qt(1 − φt)]
α−1 (12b)





In a non-liberalized economy the share of N-output that the N-sector commands for invest-
ment purposes is φ
s =
1−β
1−hδ during every period. Thus, there exists an equilibrium in such
an economy if and only if: (i) the degree of contract enforceability satisﬁes h<¯ h = βδ
−1,
so that φt is less than one; and (ii) N-sector’s productivity satisﬁes θ > θ =[ δβ(φ
s)α−1]−1/α,




In a liberalized economy there are two equilibria. The safe one we have just characterized,
where agents choose not to issue T-debt. There is also a risky equilibrium that is composed
of lucky paths which are punctuated by crises. Along a lucky path of this equilibrium
all debt is denominated in T-goods and lenders will be bailed out in the next period if a
majority of ﬁrms goes bust. Since the debt burden is not indexed to pt, there are two market
clearing prices. At the high price ﬁrms are solvent and their cash ﬂow is [1 − β]¯ ptqt.T h u s ,
φt =( 1− β)mr. H o w e v e r ,a tt h el o wp r i c eN - ﬁrms are insolvent and their cash ﬂow is only
µwp
tqt. Moreover, it can be shown that when pt = p
t, leverage is too low for fragility to arise
and the real exchange rate to take on two values at t +1 . Thus, at the time of the crisis
agents ﬁnd optimal to issue N-debt and the investment share is φt = µwms.
Resumption of risk taking takes place in the period after the crisis. Therefore, the path
38of N-sector investment is












if pt =¯ pt+1
if pt = p
t+1
(13)
The sequence {qt,p t,y t} is then determined by using (13) to replace φt in (12a)-(12c). One
can show that if crises are rare events there are thresholds for the degree of contract enforce-
ability and for N-sector’s productivity, such that if h ∈ (h,¯ h) and θ ∈ (θ,¯ θ) returns satisfy
(10), and thus a risky equilibrium exists. Notice that h<¯ h and θ > θ ensure that when
crises are rare events, investment is proﬁtable. Meanwhile, θ < ¯ θ and h>hensure that
ﬁr m sw i t hT - d e b tg ob u s ti nt h eb a ds t a t e ,a n dt h a tt h ef a l li nc a s hﬂow is translated into a
large fall in credit and N-investment, so that the fall in prices is validated. This establishes
the second result.
Result 2. Financial liberalization increases investment in the ﬁnancially constrained sector,
b u to n l yi fi tm a k e st h ee c o n o m yﬁnancially fragile and agents ﬁnd it proﬁtable to
take on credit risk. This occurs only if the degree of contract enforceability satisﬁes
h ∈ (h,¯ h).
Notice that no exogenous shocks are necessary for crises, a shift in expectations is suﬃ-
cient. A crisis can occur whenever ﬁr m se x p e c tt h a to t h e r sw i l ln o tu n d e r t a k ec r e d i tr i s k ,s o
that there is a reversion to the safe equilibrium. The key to having multiple market clearing
prices is that part of the N-sector’s demand comes from the N-sector itself. Thus, when the
price falls below a cutoﬀ level and N-ﬁrms go bust, the investment share of the N-sector falls
(from φ
l to φ
c). This, in turn, reduces the demand for N-goods, validating the fall in the
price.
We emphasize that the interaction of contract enforceability problems and systemic guar-
antees creates the fragility required for self-fulﬁlling crises. If there were no guarantees,
agents would not be willing to take on credit risk to claim the implicit subsidy, and cur-
rency mismatch would not arise. Costly enforceability of contracts would still imply that
the N-sector can grow only gradually and balance sheet eﬀects would play a role during the
39lending boom. However, there would be no endogenous force that makes a boom end in a
crisis. Alternatively, if there were only guarantees but no enforceability problems, then nei-
ther borrowing constraints nor balance sheet eﬀects would arise. Thus, N-sector investment
would not depend on its cash ﬂow.
GDP Growth and Financial Fragility. We are now ready to rationalize the link
between growth and fragility. Since N-goods are intermediate inputs, while T-goods are
ﬁnal consumption goods, gross domestic product equals the value of N-sector investment
plus T-output: gdpt = ptIt + yt. It then follows from (11)-(12c) that






1 − [1 − α]φt
[1 − φt]1−α (14)
As we can see, the key determinants of the evolution of GDP are the technological coeﬃcient
in T-production (at) and the share of N-output invested by the N-sector (φt).I n o r d e r t o
isolate the eﬀects of ﬁnancial liberalization, we have set at to one.
In a non-liberalized economy the investment share φt is constant and equal to φ
s. Thus,











Absent technological progress in the T-sector, N-sector growth is the force driving growth
in both sectors. As the N-sector expands, N-goods become more abundant and cheaper
allowing the T-sector to expand production. This expansion is possible if and only if N-
sector productivity (θ) and the N-investment share (φ
s) are high enough, so that credit and





A liberalized economy goes through a succession of lucky paths punctuated by crisis
episodes. An economy is on a lucky path at time t if there was no crisis either at t − 1 or
66The mechanism by which higher growth in the N-sector induces higher growth in the T-sector is the
decline in the relative price of N-goods that takes place in a growing economy
pt+1
pt =[ θφ
s]α−1. If there were
technological progress in the T-sector, there would be a Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect and the real exchange rate
would appreciate over time.
40at t. Since along a lucky path the investment share equals φ
l, (14) implies that the common




. Ac o m p a r i s o no fγl and (15) reveals
that as long as a crisis does not occur, growth in a liberalized economy is greater than in
a non-liberalized one. In the presence of systemic guarantees, credit risk allows ﬁnancially
constrained N-ﬁrms to borrow and invest more than in a non-liberalized economy (φ
l > φ
s).
Since there are sectorial linkages (α > 0), this increase in the N-sector’s investment share
beneﬁts both the T- and the N-sectors.
Because self-fulﬁlling crises occur with probability 1 − u, and during a crisis the invest-
ment share falls from φ
l to φ
c < φ
s,t h ef a c tt h a tγl > γNL does not imply that ﬁnancial
liberalization leads to higher mean GDP growth. The reduction in the investment share
comes about through two channels: (i) N-sector ﬁrms go bust and their cash ﬂow collapses
(captured by
µw
1−β); and (ii) leverage falls because ﬁrms cannot take on credit risk (indexed
by 1−hδ
1−hδu−1). It follows from (14) that in a crisis episode that lasts two periods, the mean





2 . As we can see variations in GDP growth generated
by real exchange rate changes at τ and τ +1cancel out. Thus, the average loss in GDP
growth stems only from the fall in the N-sector’s average investment share.
A liberalized economy experiences several crises over time. Therefore, to see whether
ﬁnancial liberalization will increase long-run growth, we compute the limit distribution of
GDP’s growth rate. Using the expressions for γl and γcr, it follows that over the long run

















Notice that ω is the proportion of time that the economy is on a lucky path over the long-run.
A comparison of long run GDP growth rates in (15) and (16) reveals that:
Result 3. Average long-run GDP growth is greater in a liberalized economy than in a non-
liberalized one provided contract enforceability problems are severe, but not too severe
67For the computation of the limit distribution see Ranciere, et.al. (2003).
41(h ∈ (h∗,h ∗∗)), and ﬁnancial distress during crises is not too large (µw >µ w).
The relationship between ﬁnancial liberalization and growth is not straightforward be-
cause an increase in the probability of crisis (1−u) has ambiguous eﬀects on long-run growth.
One the one hand, a greater 1 − u increases investment and growth along the lucky path
by increasing the subsidy implicit in the guarantee and allowing N-sector ﬁrms to be more
leveraged. On the other hand, a greater 1 − u m a k e sc r i s e sm o r ef r e q u e n t . T h ed e g r e eo f
contract enforceability h plays a key role. If we increase 1 − u, the growth enhancing eﬀect
of more investment dominates the growth reducing eﬀect of more frequent crises when h is
large enough. This is because a large h increases ﬁrms’ leverage and allows them to reap the
beneﬁts of risk-taking. However, h cannot be arbitrarily large to ensure the existence of an
equilibrium. If h were very large, borrowing constraints would not arise (by (9)), or there
would not be market clearing, as φ
l > 1 (by (13)).68
The central role played by the requirement that “h must be low, but not too low” underlies
the importance of the country sample over which the empirical link between liberalization,
and growth exists. The above result implies that among the set of countries where contract
enforceability problems are severe, but not too severe, ﬁnancial liberalization may lead to
higher growth even if we control for trade liberalization. This prediction establishes a causal
link from liberalization to GDP growth in the regressions of Section 2.
Credit Growth. Here we show that economies that have followed growth-enhancing
risky credit paths are identiﬁed by a negatively skewed distribution of credit growth. Since in
the model N-ﬁrms use only N-inputs, the appropriate measure of real credit is˜ bt =( bt+bn
t )/pt.









l − (1 − β)]qt
[φ
c − µw]qt
if π(pt) ≥ 0




s − (1 − β)]qt (17)
68Higher long-run growth comes at the cost of a higher incidence of crises. A natural question is, thus,
whether higher growth is associated with higher social welfare. Ranciere et.al. (2003) show that if T-sector
agents have access to complete capital markets, so that they can hedge real exchange rate risk, then welfare in
a risky equilibrium is greater than in a safe equilibrium provided enforceability problems are severe enough.
42In a safe non-liberalized economy credit follows a smooth path, while in a risky liberalized
economy it follows a bumpy path. Using (12a), we have that in the latter the compounded
growth rate of credit is ζ
l =l o g ( θφ
l) along a lucky path, ζ





1−hδ ) during a
crisis and ζ
p =l o g ( θφ
l 1
u) in the post-crisis period.
When skewness is negative, the good outcomes in the distribution lie closer to the mean
than the bad outcomes. We ﬁnd this credit pattern in the risky equilibrium because N-ﬁrms
face endogenous borrowing constraints, so N-sector credit is constrained by cash ﬂow. Along
the lucky path —in which no crises occur— cash ﬂow accumulates gradually, and credit can
grow only gradually. In contrast, when a crisis erupts there are widespread bankruptcies
and cash ﬂow collapses. Thus, credit growth falls sharply (ζ
c < ζ
l).I nt h ew a k eo fac r i s i s
credit growth rebounds before returning to its lucky level (ζ
p > ζ
l). As long as crises are
rare events, the credit growth rates during the post-crisis period and the lucky path are very
close (ζ
p − ζ
l)=l o g ( u−1). Since falls and rebounds occur with the same frequency, the
distribution of credit growth is characterized by negative outliers in a long enough sample.
That is
Result 4. In a risky liberalized economy the limit distribution of credit growth has negative
skewness. Meanwhile, in a non-liberalized economy credit growth has a smooth path
with zero skewness.
To link this result to our empirical ﬁndings recall that a risky equilibrium exists only if
enforceability problems are severe but not too severe, conditions which we ﬁnd in MECs.
Thus, the ﬁrst implication of this result is that ﬁnancial liberalization may lead to bumpiness
of credit growth across MECs. Since negative skewness of credit growth implies the adoption
of credit risk, which eases ﬁnancial constraints and leads to an increase in mean GDP growth
(per result 3), the second implication is that negative skewness is an appropriate RHS variable
in the growth regressions we estimate.
Notice that if enforceability problems were either not severe or too severe, there would be
no endogenous force that would make credit growth negatively skewed to begin with. Thus,
the link between negative skewness and growth would not exist. This is why skewness is
43statistically signiﬁcantly in all growth regressions, even if we do not condition on the sample
of countries.
In the model, credit growth exhibits more variance in the liberalized economy. Empir-
ically, however, variance is not a good means of identifying economies that have followed
growth-enhancing risky credit paths that lead to infrequent crises. High variance may also
reﬂect high frequency shocks, which might be exogenous or might be self-inﬂicted by, for
instance, bad economic policy. To generate high variance in both the safe and the risky
equilibria, one could include in the model high frequency exogenous shocks that do not lead
to crises. Such shocks would increase the variance of credit growth in both economies, but
would not increase mean GDP growth. The two equilibria would still be distinguished by
negative skewness of credit growth, because only the risky equilibrium would be crisis-prone.
The N-to-T Output Ratio. We have captured the sectorial asymmetry in ﬁnancing
opportunities prevalent in MECs by assuming that T-production is not aﬀected by ﬁnancial
constraints, while the N-sector faces contract enforceability problems. This sectorial asym-
metry generates two predictions about the behavior of the N-to-T output ratio (N/T) that
help us identify the mechanism that links liberalization, fragility and growth in MECs.
Since the N-sector is more ﬁnancially constrained than the T-sector, the ﬁrst prediction is
that along any equilibrium path N/T is positively correlated with domestic credit. To derive
t h es e c o n dp r e d i c t i o nn o t et h a ti tf o l l o w sf r o m( 1 2 a ) - ( 1 2 c )t h a ti nas y m m e t r i ce q u i l i b r i u m














Investment equations (8) and (9) imply that when there is a shift from a non-liberalized
to a liberalized economy the N-to-T output ratio increases from α
1−φs to α
1−φl.T h i sr e ﬂects
the fact that ﬁnancial liberalization eases ﬁnancial constraints and allows the N-sector to
command a greater share of N-inputs.69
If a crisis occurs at some date, say τ, there is a ﬁre-sale: there is a steep real exchange
69We have set at to a constant. However, one can verify that an increase in at following trade liberalization
reduces N/T.
44rate depreciation, and since there is currency mismatch, all N-ﬁrms default. As a result, the
investment share falls from φ
l to φ
c. The price of N-goods must fall to allow the T-sector to
absorb a greater share of N-output, which is predetermined by τ −1 investment. As we can
see in (18) N/T falls from α
1−φl to α
1−φc. Thus,
Result 5. Across MECs, the N-to-T output ratio: (i) responds positively to ﬁnancial liber-
alization and negatively to crises; and (ii) is positively correlated with credit growth.
Both of these implications of sectorial asymmetries are consistent with our empirical
ﬁndings in Section 3. Furthermore, sectorial asymmetries are key to explaining several
features of the boom-bust cycles experienced by many MECs, as well as Mexico’s less than
stellar growth and recent export slowdown.
45APPENDIX B 
Construction of Indexes, Data Sources, and Robustness Analysis 
Here we explain how we construct our liberalization indexes and the N-to-T output ratio, 
describe the data sets we used, and present results of some robustness tests. 
 
Liberalization Indexes 
Our de facto trade and financial liberalization indexes indicate the year when a given country 
liberalized. We construct the indexes by looking for trend breaks in trade and financial flows. We identify 
trend breaks by applying the CUSUM test of Brown and others (1975) to the time trend of the data. This 
method tests for parameter stability based on the cumulative sum of recursive residuals.
70
A MEC is trade liberalized (TL) at year t if  its trade-to-GDP ratio either has a trend break at or 
before t or has exceeded 30 percent at or before t. The 30 percent criterion identifies countries where trade 
was liberalized at the beginning of our sample (1980) or where the increase in trade flows did not take 
place from one year to the next, but instead took place over a few years.
71
To determine the date of financial liberalization, we consider net cumulative capital inflows 
(KI).
72 A country is financially liberalized (FL) at year t if  KI has a trend break at or before t and there is 
at least one year with a KI-to-GDP ratio greater than 5 percent at or before t, or if its KI-to-GDP ratio is 
greater than 10 percent at or before t, or if the country is associated with the European Union. The 5 and 
10 percent thresholds reduce the possibility of false liberalization and false nonliberalization signals, 
respectively. Table B1 lists the liberalization dates. 
In order to determine the trend breaks, we regress each KI series on a constant and a time trend. 
The CUSUM test is based on the cumulative sum of residuals of this regression. Figure B1 plots this 
cumulative sum together with the 5 percent critical values for Mexico’s KI series. The test signals 
parameter instability of the time trend if the cumulative sum exits the area between the two critical lines. 
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where wr is the recursive residual and s is the standard error of the regression fitted to all T-sample points. 
If the coefficient on the time trend remains constant from period to period, E(Wt) = 0. But if it changes, Wt 
                                                 
70 All HECs have liberalized trade and financial markets through the whole sample period. 
71 We compute the trade-to-GDP ratio as the ratio of exports plus imports over GDP, using data from the World Development 
Indicators of the World Bank. 
72 We compute cumulative net capital inflows sent by nonresidents since 1980. Capital inflows include FDI, portfolio flows, 
and bank flows. The data series are from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics, lines 78BUDZF, 
  46will tend to diverge from the zero mean value line. The significance of any departure from the zero line is 
assessed by reference to a pair of 5 percent significance lines. The distance between them increases with t. 
The 5 percent significance lines are found by connecting the points k ± 0.948(T – k)
½ and T ± 3 × 0.948(T 
– k)
½. A crossing of the critical lines by Wt signals coefficient instability.
73
When the cumulative sum of residuals starts to deviate from zero, it may take a few years until 
this deviation becomes statistically significant. To account for the delay problem, we choose the year in 
which the cumulative sum of residuals deviates from zero, provided that it eventually crosses the 5 percent 
significance level. In the case of Mexico, parameter instability begins in the fourth quarter of 1989 and 
becomes statistically significant after the fourth quarter of 1991. 
Three comments are in order. First, our TL and FL indexes do not allow for policy reversals: 
once a country liberalizes, it never becomes closed thereafter. This means that our indexes do not capture 
some policy reversals that might have occurred in the latter part of the 1990s. Since our sample period is 
1980-99, we consider our approach to be the correct one for analyzing the effects of liberalization on long-
run growth and financial fragility.
74 Second, in comparing different indexes it is convenient to distinguish 
liberalization from openness indexes. The former identify the dates of financial liberalization, whereas the 
latter measure the amount of capital flows that a country receives over a certain period. For instance, 
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001) and Kaminski and Schmukler (2002) consider liberalization 
indexes as we do, whereas Kraay (1998), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002), and Edison and others (2002) 
consider openness indexes. Finally, the country-years identified as financially liberalized by our index, as 
well as the other liberalization indexes, do not necessarily coincide with “good times,” because they 
include both boom and bust country-years. Therefore they are not subject to the criticism that liberalized 
country-years coincide with good times. The liberalization dates are reported in table B1. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                
78BGDZF, and 78BEDZ. For some countries not all three series are available for all years. In that case we use inflows to the 
banking system only, a measure that is available for all country-years. 
73 The underlying assumption is that the time series is trend stationary before the structural break. This is confirmed for the case 
of Mexico by unit root tests. The unit root tests are estimated with a constant, a time trend, and a number of lags (2) determined 
by the SIC criterion. Before liberalization the series is trend stationary. Including the post liberalization period, it has a unit root 
and is difference stationary. 
74 If, after liberalization, a country suffers a sharp reversal in capital flows (such as in a financial crisis), it might exhibit a 
second breakpoint. In our sample, however, this possibility is not present: the trend breaks due to crises are never large enough 
to show up in significant CUSUM test statistics. 
  47Table B1. Dates of Financial and Trade Liberalization and Sectors Used in N-to-T Output Ratios
a 
     
    
Sectors designated tradable and 
nontradable for regressions including 
the N-to-T output ratio
b
Country 
Date of financial 
liberalization  
Date of trade 
liberalization 
Based on export 
shares 
Based on real 
exchange rates 
Argentina 1991  1986  C, M  C, M 
Bangladesh Never  Never  S, M  S, M 
Belgium Always Always  C, M  C, M 
Brazil 1992  1988  S, M  S, M 
Chile Always  Always  C, M  C, M 
 Colombia  1991  1992  S, M  S, M 
Egypt Always  1991  S, M  S, M 
Greece Always 1986 S, M  S, M 
Hong Kong  Always  Always  NA NA 
Hungary 1994  1994  S, M  S, M 
India Never  1994  S, M  S, M 
Indonesia
c 1989 1987  S, M  S, M 
Ireland Always  Always NA NA 
Israel 1990  1986  NA NA 
Jordan 1989  Always  S, M  S, M 
Korea 1985  Always  C, M  C, M 
Malaysia Always  Always  C, M  C, M 
Mexico 1989 1988 C, M  C, M 
Morocco Never  1986  S, M  S, M 
Pakistan Never  Never  S, M  S, M 
Peru 1992  1987  M, S  S, M 
Philippines 1989  1986  C, M  C, M 
Poland Never 1993 NA S,  M 
Portugal 1986  1986 C, M  C, M 
South Africa  1994  Never  S, M  S, M 
Spain Always  1984  S, M  S, M 
Sri Lanka  Never  1989  S, M  S, M 
Thailand 1988  1986  C, M  C, M 
Tunisia Never  Always  M, S  S, M 
Turkey Always 1994  C, S  C, M 
Uruguay 1989  1988  NA NA 
Venezuela Never  Always  S, M  S, M 
Zimbabwe Never  Never  S, M  S, M 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
a. “Always” indicates that the country has been open at least since 1980; “Never” indicates that the country was closed at least until 1999. 
b. The first of each pair is the sector designated as nontradable, and the second that designated as tradable; C, construction; M, manufacturing; S, 
services. 
c. The sample does not cover the period before 1993; the financial liberalization date is therefore set to 1989, which fits the dates of Kaminsky and 
Schmukler (2002) and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001). 
 
The N-to-T Output Ratio 
We construct the N-to-T output ratio by proxying N-sector and T-sector production with data 
for construction, manufacturing, and services. In the text of the paper we use the sectoral exports-to-GDP 
ratio as the criterion for classifying the N- and T-sectors. Construction is never classified as a T-sector. 
Meanwhile the classification of services and manufacturing varies from country to country. Since the price 
  48of N-sector goods tracks international prices less closely than that of T-sector goods, we construct an 
alternative index in which we classify as nontradable the sectors in which the sectoral real exchange rate 
varies the most, and as tradable the sectors in which it varies the least. Table B1 reports both indexes. The 
correlation between them is 0.745. Table B2 shows that the regression results reported in table 4 are robust 
to the choice of index. 
 
Table B2. Regressions Testing for Sectoral Asymmetries
a  
 
Independent  variable  B2-1 B2-2 B2-3 
Financial  liberalization  1.129** 0.979** 0.996** 
  (0.142) (0.149) (0.141) 
Trade liberalization  -0.747**  -0.5618**  -0.772** 
  (0.191) (0.198) (0.203) 
Credit   0.479**  0.439** 
   (0.205)  (0.192) 
Rate of real depreciation      2.260* 
     (1.374) 
Crisis year dummy  -0.021*  -0.019*  0.003 
  (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) 
Crisis year +1  -2.444**  -2.134**  -2.240** 
  (0.144) (0.184) (0.178) 
Crisis year +2  0.207*  0.447**  0.375** 
  (0.128) (0.155) (0.147) 
Crisis year +3  -0.784**  -0.648**  -0.690** 
  (0.128) (0.130) (0.122) 
Crisis year +4  -0.478**  -0.236  0.341* 
  (0.194) (0.204) (0.194) 
Crisis year +5  0.856**  0.827**  0.911** 
  (0.184) (0.163) (0.155) 
     
Summary statistics:     
Adjusted R
2 0.691 0.728 0.745 
No. of observations  443  426  371 
Source: Authors’ regressions. 
a. Equation 3 in the text is estimated using panel data and generalized least squares; the dependent variable is the N-to-T output index based on the 
variance of the sectoral real exchange rate. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 
percent level. 
  49Robustness Tests 
Table B3 shows results of tests of the robustness of the benchmark regressions in columns 1-3 and 3-2 in tables 1 and 3, 
respectively. 
 
Table B3. Robustness Tests 






Regressions of growth on liberalization
 f    
Financial liberalization  2.980**  3.036** 1.571** 2.686** 2.467** 
  (0.363)  (0.668) (0.181) (0.132) (0.119) 
        
Summary statistics:        
Adjusted R
2 0.615 0.615 0.953 0.547 0.568 
No.    of  observations 423 423 460 450 450 
        
Regressions of growth on bumpiness measures
 g    
0.051**  0.130** 0.065** 0.123** 0.127**  Mean of real credit 
growth rate  (0.010)  (0.019) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
-0.027**  -0.030** -0.001 -0.027**  -0.032**  Standard deviation of 
real credit growth rate  (0.006)  (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
0.354**  0.212** 0.066** 0.207** 0.216**  Negative skewness of 
real credit growth rate  (0.071)  (0.097) (0.025) (0.036) (0.037) 
        
Summary statistics:        
Adjusted R
2 0.617  0.619 0.901 0.562 0.630 
No.  of observations  383  383 424 414 414 
Source: Authors’ regressions. 
a. Instrumental variables regression estimated by two-stage least squares, using the legal origin index of La Porta and others (1999) as an instrument. 
All regressions include the combined MEC and HEC sample of countries. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ** indicates significance at 
the 5 percent level. 
b. Instrumental variables regression estimated by two-stage least squares, using lagged values as instruments. 
c. Regression estimated by the generalized least squares methods allowing for fixed effects. 
d. Regression estimated with a common intercept, but leaving out China. 
e. Regression estimated with a common intercept, but leaving out Ireland. 
f. Regressions correspond to that reported in column 1-3 in the text. 
g. Regressions correspond to that reported in column 3-2 in the text. 
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